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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate order reversing the
magistrate court’s denial of Dace Huston’s motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In association with the motion to suppress at issue on appeal, the magistrate court made
the following findings of fact, none of which were challenged by Huston or in any way
contravened by the district court on intermediate appeal:
On February 7, 2019, at approximately 1:20 am Lieutenant McIntosh was
on general patrol near Cobblestone Park when he observed another vehicle
heading northbound on Plaza Road. With the intention of getting behind the
vehicle McIntosh waited for the vehicle to pass him. McIntosh observed the
vehicle’s headlights disappearing behind a berm where Plaza Road crosses the
Payette River and the lights did not reappear. This led McIntosh to investigate
what had happened to the vehicle because there are no homes or intersecting roads
in that location.
McIntosh located the vehicle, a white pickup, parked in a pull-off area
with its headlights still on. He observed the driver, later identified as Dace
Huston, standing between the vehicle and the driver’s door. McIntosh parked
approximately fifty feet behind the vehicle, turned on his overhead lights, and
walked over to the pickup. McIntosh informed the driver that the lights had been
turned on for safety and he was free to leave at any time. McIntosh’s body cam
was activated during and captured him telling Huston he was free to leave. He
then asked Huston what was going on, Huston responded, “he just got done taking
a piss.” McIntosh asked if he could see Huston’s license. Huston handed over his
license.
While McIntosh was speaking with Huston he could smell alcohol coming
from Huston’s person. Huston’s license informed McIntosh that he was under the
age of twenty-one. Huston admitted to having one beer. McIntosh informed
Huston he did not intend to arrest him for underage consumption of alcohol but
wanted to determine whether or not he was too intoxicated to drive safely. A field
sobriety test was administered. Huston failed three tests and was placed under
arrest for suspicion of Driving Under the Influence (DUI). A blood test confirmed
a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .094 g/l00cc blood.
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(R., pp. 63-64.)
The state charged Huston with driving under the influence, second offense within the
previous ten years. (R., pp. 20-21.) Huston filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that he
was seized without reasonable suspicion when Officer McIntosh initiated overhead lights,
approached him in uniform, and asked whether Huston had his driver’s license. (R., pp. 23-31.)
The state argued that the encounter was initially consensual, including because Officer McIntosh
immediately told Huston he was free to leave and the lights were on only for safety purposes, and
Officer McIntosh almost immediately thereafter acquired reasonable suspicion that Huston was
inebriated when he began speaking with Huston and smelled alcohol.

(R., pp. 40-42.)

Alternatively, the state argued that if there was a brief detention in the very short period of time
before Officer McIntosh acquired reasonable suspicion that Huston was inebriated, it was
justified by the community caretaking function. (Id.)
Officer McIntosh was the only witness at a hearing on the motion to suppress. (Tr., p. 5,
L. 15 – p. 30, L. 19.) Through his testimony, the state admitted photographs from the area in
which the events occurred as State’s Exhibit 1 (Tr., p. 8, L. 6 – p. 9, L. 4; see generally Exs.), and
a portion of the recording from Officer McIntosh’s body-cam as State’s Ex. 2 (Tr., p. 15, L. 1 –
p. 17, L. 17). 1 Officer McIntosh testified that he stopped his patrol car about fifty feet behind
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That body-cam recording was not initially in the record on appeal, but this Court granted a
motion to augment in an order dated 4/7/2021. In response, the district court clerk filed video
recordings from two body-cams: Officer McIntosh’s, in a folder titled “258 videos,” and another
officer’s, in a folder titled “288 videos.” Each folder contains six AVI files. The only video
evidence admitted in association with the motion to suppress and at issue on appeal was the first
three minutes and thirty-seven seconds of Officer McIntosh’s body-cam recording. (Tr., p. 15, L.
1 – p. 17, L. 17.) That portion of Officer McIntosh’s body-cam recording is the first three
minutes and thirty-seven seconds of the file titled: “PICT0006_2019.02.07_01.20.42.” The state
will refer to that portion of the video as “State’s Ex. 2,” and references to the video are to the
run-time.
2

Huston’s vehicle so Huston would have “plenty of room to leave,” either by pulling forward or
backing out. (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 5-16.) He testified that he got out of his vehicle and immediately
told Huston that his overhead lights were on for safety purposes only and Huston was free to
leave at any time. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 15-21.) State’s Ex. 2 begins just as Officer McIntosh
approaches Huston and informs Huston that he is free to leave at any time. (State’s Ex. 2, 00:00
– 00:03.) He testified that he almost immediately observed that Huston appeared inebriated,
including noticing his bloodshot and glassy eyes, and that Huston smelled of alcohol. (Tr., p. 17,
L. 18 – p. 18, L. 5.) At around the twenty-second mark of State’s Ex. 2, Officer McIntosh notes
the smell of alcohol and Huston’s bloodshot eyes. (State’s Ex. 2, 00:18 – 00:25.) In closing
argument, defense counsel conceded that Officer McIntosh had reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory detention at that point, but argued that Huston was unlawfully detained earlier by
virtue of the overhead lights having been activated when Officer McIntosh parked. (Tr., p. 31, L.
7 – p. 33, L. 3.)
Following the hearing, both sides submitted supplemental briefing. (R., pp. 48-52, 5460.) Huston again argued that “activation of emergency lights constitutes a seizure under Idaho
law,” there was no justification for a seizure when the lights were activated, and “[a]n officer
cannot then simply unseize a defendant by telling him he is free to go.” (R., pp. 48-52.)
The magistrate court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p. 67.) After making the factual
findings quoted above (R., pp. 63-64), the court concluded that the encounter was initially
consensual because Huston was not stopped by Officer McIntosh, but was parked and standing
outside his vehicle when Officer McIntosh parked and approached; Officer McIntosh
immediately told Huston that his lights were on only for safety purposes and Huston was free to
go at any time; Huston was in no way blocked from leaving, was not physically restrained in any

3

way, nor did he make any attempt to leave; and Officer Huston made no other show of authority
indicative of a seizure. (R., p. 65.)
Huston changed his plea to guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. (R., p. 69.) The magistrate court entered a judgment of conviction, from which Huston
filed a timely intermediate appeal to the district court. (R., pp. 72-73.)
On intermediate appeal, Huston again argued that the use of emergency lights was alone
sufficient to effect a seizure, and “[d]espite Lieutenant Mclntosh’s statement that he was free to
leave at any time, the totality of the circumstances would not lead a reasonable person to
conclude that they may be free to terminate the contact with law enforcement.” (R., pp. 96-98.)
Huston also argued that Officer McIntosh had no justification to ask if he could see Huston’s
driver’s license, and that the community caretaking function could not justify any detention
because there “were no facts present to suggest the defendant was having car trouble or was in
distress.” (R., pp. 99-100.)
The state argued that the magistrate court correctly determined that the encounter was
initially consensual; that the use of emergency lights when parking near but not directly behind
and without blocking the exit of an already-parked vehicle does not alone effect a seizure of a
person standing outside the vehicle; Huston was told he was free to leave and that the lights were
on only for safety purposes, and a reasonable person would understand that meant they were free
to leave and the lights were on only for safety purposes; Officer McIntosh was permitted as part
of a consensual encounter to talk with Huston and ask if he could see a driver’s license; and
Officer Huston almost immediately had reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative detention
based on Huston’s glassy, bloodshot eyes, and the smell of alcohol. (R., pp. 105-11.) Again, the
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state argued in the alternative that any brief detention prior to acquiring that reasonable suspicion
was justified by the community caretaking function. (R., pp. 107-08.)
The district court reversed the magistrate court on intermediate appeal. (R., pp. 112-22.)
The court held that Huston was seized because he was approached by an officer in uniform, with
a sidearm, who had initiated the lights on his patrol vehicle. (R., p. 116.) The court concluded
that Officer McIntosh’s immediate statements that the lights were on only for safety and Huston
was free to go did not alter that analysis because “nowhere in the detective’s testimony does it
appear that this was a community caretaking function”; the lights might have been on for Officer
McIntosh’s, not Huston’s, safety; and, “it does not appear that the detective followed up on his
explanation that Huston was free to go―either with words to ensure that the driver heard and
understood, or by actions that were consistent with the inquiry only being a community
caretaking function.” (R., pp. 116-17.) The court then determined that the alleged detention
could not be justified by reasonable suspicion or as part of the community caretaking function.
(R., pp. 118-21.)
The state timely appealed from the district court’s order on intermediate appeal. (R., pp.
124-26.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err by reversing the magistrate court’s denial of Huston’s motion to
suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred On Intermediate Appeal By Reversing The Magistrate Court’s Denial
Of Huston’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court erred by reversing the magistrate court on intermediate appeal. The

magistrate court was exactly right. Where a vehicle is already stopped, and in fact the driver is
standing outside of it, an officer does not effect a seizure simply by parking a good distance
away, in a manner specifically designed not to block the vehicle, activating emergency lights, and
approaching to speak with the driver. It is particularly obvious that that is so where, as here, the
driver is immediately and expressly told that the lights are on only for safety purposes and that
the driver is free to leave at any time. The district court erred by concluding otherwise. But, in
the alternative, any brief detention was justified by the community caretaking function.
B.

Standard Of Review
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the

magistrate division, this Court reviews the magistrate court record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether
the magistrate court’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho
413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, the disposition
of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho
965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, this Court reviews the magistrate court’s
findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and
the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court.
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The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).
C.

The Magistrate Court Correctly Determined Huston Was Not Detained Before Officer
McIntosh Acquired Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Conduct
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits unreasonable seizures. 2 The

exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both “primary evidence obtained as a direct result
of an illegal search or seizure” and “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an
illegality.” State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 659, 662 (2017).
However, “[a]n encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not
trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual.” State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho
482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (citations omitted). To constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure,
the officer must, “by means of physical force or show of authority,” in some way restrain an
individual’s liberty. Id. Thus, unless the officer conveys a message that compliance is required,
the encounter is deemed consensual. Id. “[T]he proper inquiry in determining whether a seizure
occurred is whether, under all the circumstances surrounding an encounter, a reasonable person
would have felt free to leave or otherwise decline the officer’s requests and terminate the

2

Below, in support of his motion to suppress, Huston cited both the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp. 26-27.) But he
has never argued, and neither the magistrate nor district courts ever held, that the latter provides
some greater protection than the former in this case. “Appellate court review is limited to the
evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.” Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710,
714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007). The state will therefore focus on the Fourth Amendment.
8

encounter.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004) (quotation marks
omitted). However, the mere fact that the person in question chose not to leave is not evidence
that a reasonable person would not feel “free to leave”―willing compliance is not itself
indicative of a detention. “[W]hile ‘most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that
people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the
consensual nature of the response.’” State v. Nelson, 134 Idaho 675, 679, 8 P.3d 670, 674 (Ct.
App. 2000) (quoting I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)). For the same reason, “a
request for identification or mere questioning is not enough, by itself[,] to constitute a seizure.”
State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2004) (citations omitted). See also
State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 613, 7 P.3d 219, 222 (2000) (“[E]ven without reasonable
suspicion that he had committed a crime … [i]nterrogating a person concerning his identification
or requesting identification does not, without more, constitute a seizure.” (citing Delgado, 466
U.S. at 216)).
“When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of an illegal
seizure, the burden of proving that a seizure occurred is on the defendant.” Page, 140 Idaho at
843, 103 P.3d at 456 (quotation marks omitted).
There was no dispute below that Officer McIntosh had reasonable suspicion that Huston
was inebriated, and so reasonable suspicion to investigate driving under the influence, very
shortly after encountering Huston. Officer McIntosh testified that he observed Huston’s glassy,
bloodshot eyes as he approached Huston, and smelled alcohol as soon as he began speaking with
Huston. (Tr., p. 17, L. 18 – p. 18, L. 5.) The body-cam recording reflects that Officer McIntosh
was standing next to and talking with Huston within ten seconds of the beginning of the video,
and told Huston at around twenty seconds into the encounter that he could smell alcohol and
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observed Huston’s eyes were bloodshot. (State’s Ex. 2, 00:00 – 00:25.) At the suppression
hearing, defense counsel conceded that Officer McIntosh had reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory detention when he smelled alcohol and observed Huston’s bloodshot eyes, and
argued that the question was whether Huston was unlawfully seized before then, merely by the
fact that the lights were activated and an officer approached him in uniform. (Tr., p. 31, L. 7 – p.
34, L. 22 (agreeing that once Officer McIntosh detects “the presence of glass and bloodshot eyes
or the odor of an alcoholic beverage” there is a legitimate investigatory detention, but “our
argument is that the seizure occurred immediately upon the activation of the lights, because until
the detective the detective came out and told my client he was free to leave, an illegal seizure had
occurred at that point”).) Thus, Huston’s motion to suppress hinged primarily on whether
Huston was unlawfully seized in the ten seconds before Officer McIntosh began interacting with
Huston and recognized that he was under the influence. The magistrate concluded that he was
not (R., pp., 64-66), and the district court concluded that he was (R., pp. 116-17).
The district court erred by reversing the magistrate court. The district court endorsed the
view that the use of lights on a marked vehicle, with Officer McIntosh approaching to speak with
Huston while in uniform, was alone sufficient to constitute a seizure, and that was so
notwithstanding the fact that Huston was explicitly told he was not being seized and was free to
leave. (R., pp. 115-16.) That view is contrary to both the applicable law and to common sense.
The first thing that Officer McIntosh said to Huston was that the lights were on only for
safety purposes and that he was “free to go at any time [he] want[ed].” (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 15-21;
State’s Ex. 2, 00:00 – 00:03.) As this Court has held, “‘[n]o reasonable person who has been
unequivocally told that he may go . . . would believe that he should disregard the statement
merely because the patrol car’s overhead lights are still flashing.’” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho
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655, 659, 152 P.3d 16, 20 (2007) (quoting State v. Roark, 140 Idaho 868, 871, 103 P.3d 481, 484
(Ct. App. 2004)); see also United States v. Polk, 97 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996) (no
detention where defendant was approached by uniformed officer, shown a badge, but told he was
free to leave); United States v. Brown, 38 F. App’x 449, 452 (9th Cir. 2002) (“a reasonable
person would have felt free to leave when told he could do so in the course of a friendly
encounter”). There was nothing to suggest that Officer McIntosh was not telling the truth here.
Even assuming, contrary to fact, that the activation of the lights was sufficient alone to detain
Huston initially, that extraordinarily brief detention ended when Huston was told the lights were
only on for safety purposes (not to detain him) and he was free to leave. 3 See Henage, 143 Idaho
at 659, 152 P.3d at 20 (holding that what was a traffic stop became a consensual encounter,
notwithstanding the fact that officer’s lights were still on, when defendant was told he was free to
leave).
But, even setting aside Officer McIntosh’s explicit statement that the lights were on only
for safety and Huston was free to leave, the lights alone were not sufficient to effect a detention.
In State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 211 P.3d 91 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a
circumstance, like this one, involving an already parked vehicle and the use of overhead lights.
Willoughby was sitting in his parked car in a lot when officers arrived with lights and sirens on
to investigate a reported fight, and the officers then approached to talk with Willoughby.
Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 484-85, 211 P.3d at 93-94. 4

The district court determined that

Willoughby was seized when officers parked near Willoughby with lights and sirens on. Id. at

3

And, of course, there was no evidence gathered by the officer during that hypothetical,
extraordinarily brief detention.
4
Here, unlike the officers in Willoughby, Officer McIntosh did not employ any siren.
11

486, 211 P.3d at 95. The Court of Appeals then affirmed that view. State v. Willoughby, No.
33350, 2008 WL 73630, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2008).
After granting a petition for review, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed “whether the
officers’ use of overhead emergency lights in close proximity to a parked vehicle constitutes a
show of authority that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or
her to restrict his or her movement.” Id. at 487, 211 P.3d at 96 (quotation marks omitted). The
Court held that, though the use of overhead lights under such circumstances was not by itself
sufficient to effect a seizure, “the use of overhead lights is a significant factor a court must
consider when considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. The Court went on to affirm
the district court’s determination that Willoughby was seized, but specifically because the
appellate record was incomplete and the Court would not assume that the district court erred
from an incomplete record. It noted that the district court had the benefit of viewing diagrams of
the parking lot, indicating the exits and where the various vehicles were parked, but that those
diagrams were not in the appellate record. Id. at 487-88, 211 P.3d at 96-97. The court stated that
whether the officers were blocking Willoughby’s ability to exit the parking lot was a significant
factor in that totality of the circumstances analysis and the record before the Court did not
“reflect the layout of the parking lot, including the location and number of exits nor d[id] the
record reflect whether the officers parked their vehicles behind or in front of Willoughby’s
vehicle or whether the officers’ vehicles would have impeded any effort by Willoughby to leave
had he so desired.” Id. at 488, 211 P.3d at 97. The Court therefore declined to presume that the
district court erred. Thus, while the Court affirmed the district court’s view that Willoughby was
seized, it did so only because it is the appellant’s obligation to ensure a record adequate for
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review and the record did not contain the diagrams showing whether Willoughby’s vehicle was
blocked by the officers’ cars. Id.
Willoughby makes clear that a defendant sitting in (much less standing near) a parked
vehicle is not detained simply because a uniformed officer in a marked vehicle employed
overhead lights (and even a siren, which was not employed here) and approached the vehicle to
speak with the defendant. Willoughby strongly implies that the result in that case would have
been different if the Court had evidence that Willoughby’s vehicle was not blocked in any way.
As the Court emphasized, while use of overhead lights is a “significant factor,” it is just one
factor in the totality of the circumstances relevant to determining whether a seizure has occurred,
and is not by itself dispositive. Id. at 487, 211 P.3d at 96. See
also State
- --- - -v.
- -Ray,
- - 153 Idaho 564,
567, 286 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2012) (holding that where an officer initiated his overhead lights to
effectuate a traffic stop of a Subaru, and both the Subaru and the defendant, driving a nearby
Toyota, stopped in response to the lights, defendant was not seized, though officer parked near
the Toyota with overhead lights activated, and though the officer immediately walked back to
speak to the defendant).
Nor is Idaho remotely unique in having so concluded.

See, e.g., United States v.

Clements, 522 F.3d 790, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that there was no seizure where officer
parked behind defendant’s already-parked vehicle, initiated the patrol car’s overhead lights, and
approached to speak to the defendant); Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2006)
(same); State v. Hanson, 504 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Minn. 1993) (same); State v. Blair, 14 P.3d 660,
666 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (same); Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)
(same); State v. Dubois, 706 P.2d 588, 589 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (same). These cases reflect that a
reasonable person would understand that the use of overhead lights in such circumstances―as
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opposed to in an ordinary traffic stop―may be associated with various purposes unrelated to
detaining someone in or standing near an already-parked vehicle, such as officer safety, an
attempt to alert the occupant of the vehicle to the officer’s presence, or in responding to an
emergency entirely unrelated to the occupant. See Martin, 104 S.W.3d at 301 (recognizing that,
in such circumstances, “officers may well activate their emergency lights for reasons of highway
safety or so as not to unduly alarm the stopped motorists,” rather than to indicate the defendant
was detained).
Nor were there any other indications in the totality of the circumstances indicating Huson
was detained. Officer McIntosh did not activate his siren. (See generally State’s Ex. 2.) He
parked roughly fifty feet away from Huston in a manner that was specifically designed to ensure
that Huston would have “plenty of room to leave,” either by pulling forward or backing out. (Tr.,
p. 19, Ls. 5-16.) He spoke to Huston politely and calmly, and asking “What’s going on?”
(State’s Ex. 2, 00:00 – 00:05.) The district court erred by concluding that Officer McIntosh’s use
of emergency lights when he parked fifty feet away from an already-parked vehicle and
approached Huston in uniform was alone sufficient to constitute a seizure notwithstanding the
fact that Officer McIntosh specifically told Huston that the lights were on only for safety and he
was free to leave at any time.
According to the district court, the fact that Huston was told the lights were on only for
safety purposes “adds nothing to any consideration of Huston’s awareness of authority” because
the lights arguably enhanced the safety of Officer McIntosh but did not make Huston’s
“encounter with the detective safer.” (R., pp. 116-17.) That claim is puzzling because the
obvious import of the statement that the lights were on “for safety” is simply that they were not
on to indicate that Huston was being detained, which Officer McIntosh made even more clear
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when he told McIntosh that he was free to go at any time. The fact that the lights were not on to
indicate Huston was being detained, and Officer McIntosh said as much, obviously does add
something to the question whether a reasonable person would think they were being detained
because the lights were on. That remains true even if the safety considerations that led Officer
McIntosh to turn on the lights largely (even if not exclusively) concerned his safety and not
Huston’s.
The district court discounted the explicit statement that Huston was free to leave because,
according to the court, “it does not appear that the detective followed up on his explanation that
Huston was free to go―either with words to ensure that the driver heard and understood, or by
actions that were consistent with the inquiry only being a community caretaking function.” (R.,
p. 117.) The district court did not cite any authority―and neither did Huston below―for the
proposition that an officer’s statement that the defendant is free to go is a significant factor in the
totality of the circumstances only if the officer verifies that the defendant actually heard and
understood his statement. Such a rule makes no more sense than would a rule that an officer who
tells someone that they are not free to go has not affected a seizure unless the officer confirms
that he was heard. The inquiry concerning whether Huston was seized is an objective one
focusing on what a “reasonable person” in the totality of the circumstances would conclude
regarding whether they were free to leave, not a subjective one regarding what Huston actually
thought. Henage, 143 Idaho at 658, 152 P.3d at 19; State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 592, 903
P.2d 752, 757 (Ct. App. 1995) (“The import of [U.S. v.] Mendenhall[, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55
(1980)] was to establish that the test for a “show of authority” is an objective one based upon
how a reasonable person would have understood the officer’s words and actions, not a subjective
standard turning upon the individual defendant’s perception as to whether his freedom of action
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was restricted.”). It is perfectly reasonable to assume, as part of that objective inquiry, that what
was said plainly and in a normal tone of voice was heard. Importantly, there is no evidence that
Huston did not hear and understand Officer McIntosh’s statement. The magistrate court found
that “McIntosh informed [Huston] that the lights had been turned on for safety and he was free to
leave at any time,” and there is nothing to contravene that finding. (R., p. 64.) Officer McIntosh
spoke audibly, in relatively close proximity to Huston, and Huston is an English speaker who
engaged in conversation with Officer McIntosh. Though irrelevant given the objective inquiry,
Huston could have (but did not) testify that he never heard Officer McIntosh or that he heard him
but for some reason did not understand him. See
- -Page,
- - 140 Idaho at 843, 103 P.3d at 456
(“When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of an illegal
seizure, the burden of proving that a seizure occurred is on the defendant.” (quotation marks
omitted)). The district court erred by discounting Officer McIntosh’s statement that Huston was
free to leave because Officer McIntosh did not did somehow verify at the scene that Huston
understood him.
Neither was it in any way relevant (or, as discussed in the next section, even true) that, as
the district court claimed, “nowhere in the detective’s testimony does it appear that this was a
community caretaking function.” (R., pp. 116-17.) Again, the inquiry whether Huston was
seized focuses on whether a reasonable person would have understood that they could leave, not
the officer’s subjective reason for engaging in the encounter. What Officer McIntosh was
thinking about the reason for the encounter is irrelevant to whether this was a seizure. Likewise,
whether any alleged seizure could be justified by the community caretaking function is irrelevant
to the analytically prior question whether there was a seizure to begin with. Moreover, as
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discussed below, it is simply false that there is no evidence that Officer McIntosh was initially
engaged in a community caretaking function. 5
Finally, the district court noted that “Huston obeyed the detective’s requests, acting as he
would have done under a custodial interrogation.” (R., p. 117.) It is not clear to what “requests”
the district court was referring.

Again, the allegedly unlawful detention, if one occurred,

occurred within the first ten seconds of the body-cam video, before Officer McIntosh noticed the
smell of alcohol and Huston’s bloodshot eyes. Officer McIntosh initially asked what Huston was
“doing,” and Huston responded (in so many words) that he was urinating. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 15-24;
State’s Ex. 2, 00:02 – 00:10.) Officer McIntosh then asked where Huston was “coming from,”
and Huston responded from a friend’s. (State’s Ex. 2, 00:10 – 00:14.) Finally, Officer McIntosh
asked if Huston had a driver’s license and whether Huston would “mind” if he looked at it, and
Huston said “Yeah,” and handed Officer McIntosh his license. (Tr., p. 11, L. 24 – p. 12, L. 2;
State’s Ex. 2, 00:14 – 00:18.) It was only then that Officer McIntosh asked questions regarding
alcohol and commented that he smelled alcohol and Huston’s eyes were bloodshot. (State’s Ex.
2, 00:17 – 00:25.) Officer McIntosh testified that he observed indications that Huston was
inebriated as soon as he started talking with him. (Tr., p. 17, L. 18 – p. 18, L. 5.) So, assuming
that the “request” to which the district court was referring was Officer McIntosh’s question
whether Huston would mind if Officer McIntosh looked at Huston’s license, it appears that
request came after Officer McIntosh had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention. But
even assuming it came before, an officer does not detain someone by asking if he can see
identification. “Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may

5

Though, again, whether there was or was not such evidence is irrelevant to the question whether
Huston was detained, as opposed to the question whether the detention was lawful.
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generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine identification.” State v. Loosli, 167
Idaho 435, 470 P.3d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 2020). See
also -----Landreth, 139 Idaho at 990, 88 P.3d
- --at 1230. Just as the request does not create a detention, neither does the choice to comply.
Nelson, 134 Idaho at 679, 8 P.3d at 674 (“[W]hile ‘most citizens will respond to a police request,
the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly
eliminates the consensual nature of the response.’” (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216)). That is
most obviously so where the person being asked has already been explicitly told that he is free to
go at any time.
The district court erred by reversing the magistrate court’s determination that Huston was
not detained before Officer McIntosh had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention.
Use of lights when parking near, but without blocking, an already-parked vehicle and then
approaching the vehicle is not sufficient to detain a person standing outside that vehicle,
particularly when the person is told that they are free to leave and the lights are on only for
safety. Officer McIntosh then immediately acquired reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct
sufficient for an investigatory detention.
D.

In The Alternative, Any Brief Detention Was Justified By The Community Caretaking
Function
“[R]easonable suspicion of criminal activity is not the only justification for a limited

seizure of the person.” State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992). “A detention may
also be reasonable under the officer’s community caretaking function.” State v. Mireles, 133
Idaho 690, 692, 991 P.2d 878, 880 (Ct. App. 1999) “The community caretaking function
involves the duty of police officers to help citizens an officer reasonably believes may be in need
of assistance.” Id. “Among the core community caretaking activities are the responsibilities of
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police to search for missing persons, mediate disputes, aid the ill or injured, and provide
emergency services.” State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302, 141 P.3d 1166, 1171 (Ct. App. 2006).
“In analyzing community caretaking function cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality of the
circumstances test. The constitutional standard is whether the intrusive action of the police was
reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754,
947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “Once it is clear
that a driver does not need assistance the community caretaking purpose has been fulfilled. Any
continued seizure turns the stop from a community caretaking stop into an investigatory stop.”
Godwin, 121 Idaho at 499-500, 826 P.2d at 460-61.
Below, the state argued that even if there was a brief detention before Officer McIntosh
acquired reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, that detention was justified by the community
caretaking function. (R., pp. 40-41, 107-08.) While the magistrate court correctly concluded that
there was no such detention, the court also found that Officer McIntosh initially parked and
engaged with Huston as part of an “investigation into whether or not the driver of the vehicle was
safe.” (R., p. 65.) The district court then rejected any application of the community caretaking
function because, according to the court, Officer McIntosh was not sufficiently confident that
Huston was in need of assistance and because Officer McIntosh could have inquired whether
Huston needed assistance without turning on his lights. (R., pp. 120-21.)
Officer McIntosh testified that in the middle of the night, in a rural area where there were
no intersecting roads, no houses, and no other locations to which Huston might have been
travelling, Huston’s vehicle disappeared around a bend in the road and simply did not reappear.
(Tr., p. 6, L. 14 – p. 7, L. 24.) He expressed concern that “something happened” with Huston and
was checking on him as a result. (Id.) His inquiry into whether Huston required assistance was
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then quickly derailed when, immediately after interacting with Huston, it became clear that he
was inebriated. (Tr., p. 28, L. 17 – p. 29, L. 11.)
In the testimony cited by the district court for the proposition that Officer McIntosh was
not sufficiently confident that Huston required assistance, Officer McIntosh testified only that he
did not see some additional indication that Huston’s vehicle had broken down or otherwise
required assistance. (R., pp. 120-21 (citing Tr., p. 21, L. 16 – p. 22, L. 5).) That, of course, is
perfectly consistent with Officer McIntosh having good reason to believe that Huston might
require assistance simply in virtue of the facts that he knew: that Huston’s car had disappeared in
the middle of the night in a location where there was nowhere to go. Though it is true that
Officer McIntosh did not ask if Huston’s vehicle had broken down when he interacted with
Huston, he testified that he asked what Huston “was doing,” immediately suspected Huston was
under the influence, and so pursued that inquiry rather than one regarding whether Huston had
broken down or otherwise required assistance. (Tr., p. 28, L. 17 – p. 29, L. 11; State’s Ex. 2,
00:00 – 00:25.) But, again, it is at that point―when Officer McIntosh smelled alcohol and saw
Huston’s bloodshot eyes immediately on interacting with him―that Huston concedes Officer
McIntosh had reasonable suspicion sufficient for a detention to investigate possible driving under
the influence. The district court’s conclusion that the “interrogation cannot be sustained on this
basis” is thus inapposite. (R., p. 121.) There was no “interrogation,” only questions regarding
Huston’s consumption of alcohol that evening. But, more importantly, those questions came
after Huston concedes Officer McIntosh had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention.
The questions are “sustained” on the basis of that reasonable suspicion. Assuming arguendo
there was a brief detention when Officer McIntosh parked, turned on his lights and approached, it
is only that which must be – and is – justified by the community caretaking function.

20

While Officer McIntosh did testify that he was also concerned about the possibility of
some criminal conduct when he initially parked (Tr., p. 21, Ls. 4-12), an officer “may harbor at
least an expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime” consistent with the community
caretaking function. State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 304, 47 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ct. App. 2002).
Idaho’s courts have held that a seizure authorized by the community caretaking function must be
“totally divorced” from the investigation of crime. State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302, 141 P.3d
1166, 1171 (Ct. App. 2006). But that rule requires only that the seizure is justified entirely in
terms of community caretaking, without relying on an justification associated with a criminal
investigation; it does not imply that the community caretaking function applies only in
circumstances where the officer is one-hundred percent confident there is no criminal conduct
occurring.
With respect to the application of the community caretaking function, this case is very
like State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 991 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999). There, an officer was
following a vehicle reported as suspicious, the vehicle suddenly pulled to the side of the road, the
officer initiated his overhead lights, and parked behind the vehicle. Id. at 691, 991 P.2d at 879.
The Court of Appeals held that, by virtue of the use of the overhead lights, there was a seizure.
Id. at 692, 991 P.2d at 880.

Specifically addressing Mireles, that holding was squarely

repudiated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486-87, 211 P.3d at 95-96.
But the Court of Appeals in Mireles went on to hold that the very brief, non-invasive seizure was
justified by the community caretaking function. Mireles, 133 Idaho at 692-94, 991 P.2d at 88082. Citing a number of cases addressing the use of overhead lights in similar circumstances, the
court noted that the use of overhead lights serves legitimate safety purposes. Id. Finding that the
officer had reason to believe there might be something wrong with the driver or the vehicle, and
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that the “intrusion into Mireles’s privacy was minimal,” the court held that the community
caretaking function justified the very brief detention associated with the use of overhead lights.
Id. --See --also ----------State v. Bakewell, 730 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Neb. 2007) (finding community caretaking
-function justified brief detention where previous driving pattern of vehicle suggested there might
be something wrong with the vehicle or the occupant might be lost).
As was the detention of Mireles, any intrusion into Huston’s privacy was exceptionally
minimal; in fact, even more so than was the detention of Mireles, as Huston was not even in his
vehicle but was standing outside of it. Officer McIntosh testified that his lights were on for
safety purposes and that Huston was told as much. The detention, assuming arguendo that there
was one, lasted seconds before Officer McIntosh had reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct
that justified an investigative detention, during which time Officer McIntosh was friendly with
Huston and made no show of authority. Particularly in light of the extremely slight imposition
on Huston’s privacy, it was perfectly reasonable for Officer McIntosh to take the precaution of
activating his lights to safeguard his safety in the middle of the night, alone, in a secluded area.
Finally, the district court suggested that Officer McIntosh did not need to park and walk
up to Huston’s vehicle to speak to him at all, but could have “called out” to see if Huston needed
assistance. (R., p. 121.) But precisely the same could have been said in Mireles and that fact did
not prevent the conclusion that the brief detention there was justified by the community
caretaking function. There was nothing unreasonable in Officer McIntosh’s choice to talk with
Huston rather than yelling out of a car. The question is not whether the district court judge
would have done something different under the circumstances, but whether the brief detention
(again, assuming arguendo there was one) was reasonable and justified in light of the very slight
imposition on Huston and Officer McIntosh’s reasonable belief that Huston might have broken
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down or otherwise be in need of assistance. See Godwin, 121 Idaho at 495-96, 826 P.2d at 45657 (holding that where officer pulled over near already-parked vehicle to determine if occupant
needed assistance, turned on emergency lights, and thereafter effected detention when he told the
occupant of the vehicle to stay in the car while he checked the occupant’s driving status, that
brief detention was reasonable, and therefore justified, in part for safety reasons). It clearly was.
Assuming Huston was detained by use of the lights and Officer McIntosh approaching in
uniform, the district court erred by concluding that the exceptionally brief and non-intrusive
detention was not justified by the community caretaking function.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order on
intermediate appeal reversing the magistrate court’s denial of Huston’s motion to suppress.
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